Structured Settlement Sales and Lead-Poisoned Sellers: Just Say No by Czapanskiy, Karen
Page 1  
Structured Settlement Sales and Lead-Poisoned Sellers: 
Just Say No 
 
 
Karen Syma Czapanskiy1 
   
                                                          
1 Professor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  Thanks for ideas, insights, critiques and 
challenges go to Anne Hurley, Christine Betz, Dana Czapanskiy, the participants in my seminar at Maryland in 2016 
and 2017, to my research assistants and to faculty who attended the “half-baked” presentation at the University of 
Maryland Carey School of Law and the SEALS Conference Panel on Current Issues in Family and Juvenile Law II.  The 
University of Maryland Foundation has provided financial support for my research for many years, and I continue 
to be grateful. 
Page 2  
An unexpected consequence of the tragedy surrounding the death of Freddie Gray in Baltimore 
in 2015 was a series of newspaper articles about Gray’s sale of benefits awarded as part of his mother’s 
suit on his behalf against a landlord in whose property Gray had been poisoned by lead paint.2  Instead 
of accepting a lump sum damage award, Gray’s mother accepted a “structured settlement” under which 
Gray would receive a periodic stipend.3   
When Gray turned 18, he acquired the usual legal rights of adults to manage his money.  When 
he was 24, against the advice of his mother and step-father, Gray entered into two transactions to sell 
parts of the income stream:  one for payments totaling $72,970.80, and one for payments totaling 
$145,941.60.4  The buyer paid Gray $28,720.50 for the first and $18,257.70 for the second.   Gray’s two 
                                                          
2 See Terrence McCoy, Lead Poisoning is ‘Toxic Legacy’ that Still Haunts Freddie Gray’s Baltimore, WASHINGTON POST 
(5/1/2015); Terrence McCoy, How Companies Make Millions off Lead-Poisoned, Poor Blacks, WASHINGTON POST 
(8/25/2015); Terrence McCoy, Cashing in off Poor Lead-Poisoning Victims, Washington Post (8/26/2015); Terrence 
McCoy, Tighter Rules Sought for Md. Settlement Buyouts, WASHINGTON POST (8/27/2015); Terrence McCoy, 
Crackdown on Structured-Settlement Buyouts, WASHINGTON POST (9/14/2015); Terrence McCoy, Md. Panel Backs 
Shift in Lawsuit Payouts, WASHINGTON POST (10/10/2015); Terrence McCoy, 2 Md. Lawyers under Inquiry, 
WASHINGTON POST (11/19/2015);  Terrence McCoy, Court Affirms Payout Changes, WASHINGTON POST (11/24/2015);  
Terrence McCoy, Maryland Probes Buying of Settlement Payouts by ‘Unregistered Shell’ Firms,  WASHINGTON POST 
(12/18/2015); Terrence McCoy, Perils of Early Payoffs in Virginia, WASHINGTON POST (12/28/2015); Deborah Bailey, 
Md. Legislature Seeks Lead Protections for People Like Freddie Gray, THE AFRO (3/9/2016). 
3 The exact amount and duration of the structured settlement are part of an agreement whose terms have not 
been made public.  The suit also included claims of Gray’s two sisters.  Their claims were also concluded with 
confidential structured settlements.  See Carolina Gray et al. v. Rochkind, Baltimore City Circuit Court, 
24C08001821, filed 3/14/2008.  
4 Petition of Freddie Gray, Jr., CAE14-07911 (4/3/2014); State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, 
Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement Spreadsheet (2016). 
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sisters, also lead-poisoned as children, entered into similar sales at the same time.  Carolina Gray was 
paid $28,578.93 for payments totaling $72,292.80 and $18,117 for payments totaling $144,890.40.5  
Fredricka Gray was paid $28,457.94 for payments totaling $72,292.80 and $18,079.00 for payments 
totaling 144,585.60.6  Petitions for judicial approval of the sales were filed in the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County,7 which is about 40 miles from the Circuit Court for Baltimore, where the Grays lived.  
None of the Gray siblings attended the judicial hearings held on their petitions.8  No notification of the 
hearing was sent to their mother or step-father.9  Each hearing lasted under three minutes.10    
                                                          
5 Petition of Carolina Gray, CAE14-07910 (4/3/2014); State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer 
Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint 
Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement Spreadsheet (2016). 
6 Petition of Fredricka Gray, CAE14-07909 (4/3/2014); State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer 
Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint 
Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement Spreadsheet (2016). 
7 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access 
Funding, LLC, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding 
Structured Settlement Spreadsheet (2016); Terrence McCoy, Cashing in off Poor Lead-Poisoning Victims, 
WASHINGTON POST (8/25/2015). 
8 See Terrence McCoy, How Companies Make Millions off Lead-Poisoned, Poor Blacks, WASHINGTON POST 
(8/25/2015). 
9 Like other states, the Maryland statute does not include the seller’s parent, dependent or other people 
knowledgeable about the seller’s circumstances within the term “interested party,” so they do not receive notice 
of the hearing or an opportunity to participate.  See Daniel W. Hindert and Craig H. Ulman, Transfers of Structured 
Settlement Payment Rights:  What Judges Should Know about Structured Settlement Protection Acts, 44 No. 2 
JUDGES’ J. 19, 27 (2005). 
10 See Terrence McCoy, How Companies Make Millions off Lead-Poisoned, Poor Blacks, WASHINGTON POST 
(8/25/2015).) 
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The question for this article is whether courts should permit sales of periodic payments under a 
structured settlement when the structured settlement is compensation paid by the defendant in a tort 
suit brought by or on behalf of the seller for damages caused by childhood lead poisoning that left the 
seller incapable of self-support.11  I conclude that allowing sales in this situation is unjustifiable.   
My reasoning has four elements.   The first is about autonomy.  Respect for the personal 
autonomy of the seller is important, but a person who has been deprived of the capacity for self-support 
by lead poisoning is also unusually likely to be a person whose long-term financial decisions are self-
destructive.  Where the structured settlement is agreed to by a parent on behalf of a lead-poisoned 
child, respect for the parent’s personal autonomy is also important.  Current law gives the parent no 
opportunity to have a say about a sale of structured settlement payments, even in cases where the 
parent agreed to a bar on the assignment of the benefits and where the parent is likely to become 
responsible for the care of the seller who spends a lump sum improvidently.    
The second issue is whether lead-poisoned sellers can be protected from being exploited by 
factoring companies that arrange for sales of structured settlement benefits without spending an undue 
                                                          
11 While I am arguing that sales involving lead-poisoned sellers should be prohibited, a similar argument can and 
possibly should be made with respect to other groups of cognitively-impaired individuals.  I am limiting my 
argument here because so many factoring transactions involve lead-poisoned sellers and the nature of the harms 
inflicted by lead poisoning are well known.  See Alexander L. Ash, It’s Your Money and We Want It Now: Regulation 
of the Structured Settlement Factoring Industry in the Era of Dodd-Frank and the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, 86 MISS. L.J. 151, 173-75 (2017) (arguing for barring sales of structured settlements by additional groups of 
sellers); In re Riddell, 138 Wash. App. 485 (2007), as amended on reconsideration (7/3/2007) (modification of trust 
to convert it to special needs trust granted where beneficiary lacked capacity to make good financial decisions 
because of her schizophrenia affective disorder and bipolar disorder); Black v. Duffie, 2016 Ark. App. 584 (voiding 
transfers of property made by an elderly woman with limited IQ, cognitive decline and lack of business 
experience).  But see Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):  Substituted Decision Making as a Violation 
of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 164-67, 171-175 
(2010). 
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amount of taxpayer resources to provide public supervision of the transactions.  This is not a new 
concern,12 but it has not been discussed before in the context of lead-poisoned sellers.  Third, while 
converting an income stream to a lump sum is desirable in a limited number of cases, judicial 
procedures adequate to the task of discriminating between desirable and undesirable sales would be 
costly compared to the usual lack of benefit to potential sellers.  Fourth, improvident sales unfairly 
impose costs on taxpayers, communities and parents, even though both the government and, in most 
cases, parents, expend resources establishing the structured settlement as a reliable source of support 
for the sellers.    
This article will consider whether the issues raised by sales of structured settlement benefits by 
lead-poisoned recipients could be addressed by using one of three alternatives to a ban on sales.  First, 
treat the sale like any other contract for the sale of an asset and eliminate both the tax benefits 
accorded to structured settlements and the judicial review required by federal tax law.  Second, 
maintain the current structure under which the buyer acquires favorable tax treatment only if the sale is 
subject to the type of judicial approval process required by federal law and enacted in most states.  
Third, allow the sale only with the consent of a guardian of the seller’s property.  After considering each 
alternative in light of the harms suffered by lead-poisoned sellers, the preferences of and costs to their 
                                                          
12 See In re Settlement Capital Corp., 1 Misc. 3d 446, 463, 769 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 2003):  “The Legislative 
Memorandum in Support of Laws of 2002 (ch. 537) (2002 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2035, 2036) relating 
to the enactment of the Structured Settlement Protection Act set forth the following as justification for the act: 
Recently a growing number of factoring companies have used aggressive advertising, plus the 
allure of quick and easy cash, to induce settlement recipients to cash out future payments, often 
at substantial discounts, depriving victims and their families of the long-term financial security 
their structured settlements were designed to provide. Although transfers of structured 
settlement payments are generally prohibited by contract (and often prohibited under applicable 
state law) factoring companies have built a rapidly expanding business around circumventing 
these prohibitions.”  
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parents, the practices of factoring companies, the capacities of courts, the limits of guardianships, and 
the costs to taxpayers and communities, I argue that none is an adequate substitute for a ban on sales.13   
Section One describes the usual consequences to people who are exposed to lead poisoning as 
children.  Section Two explains structured settlements and how benefits are sold.  Section Three 
explains and critiques alternatives to banning sales.  Section Four, explains why the better solution is to 
just say no.    
Section One:  Lead Poisoning 
Exposure to lead happens to thousands of children a year.14  The most common sources of lead 
exposure are paint, water pipes and soil.15  Many exposed children live in poor communities of color, 
such as West Baltimore, where Freddie Grey lived and died, or Flint, Michigan, where 30,000 children 
                                                          
13 The most attractive alternative to a ban on sales would be to incorporate into the state review process a strong 
presumption against approval of petitions to approve the sale of structured settlements.  As discussed later, the 
approval process is questionable on both substantive and procedural grounds.  If those could be cured, then 
considering incorporating a strong presumption against approval would be a useful approach.  It would allow, for 
example, the sale of a structured settlement income stream if the seller or a member of the seller’s family is close 
to death and needs a lump sum to access potentially life-saving medical treatment.  The problem is that curing the 
procedural problems in the state review process is unlikely at best, because courts are unlikely to put the energy 
necessary for the task when the sellers are usually from poor communities of color whose petitions are usually 
heard in overworked and under-funded urban courtrooms.   
14  See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS FOR 
CHILDREN AFFECTED BY LEAD (April 2015) (“estimated that tens of millions of U.S. children have been adversely 
affected by lead over the last 20 years); Emily A. Benfer, Contaminated Childhood: How the United States Failed to 
Prevent the Chronic Lead Poisoning of Low-Income Children and Communities of Color 6-7, forthcoming, HARVARD 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, 2017, (available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977465). 
15 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS FOR 
CHILDREN AFFECTED BY LEAD 1 (April 2015); Benfer, supra, at 6-7. 
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were exposed to contaminated water delivered by a poorly-managed municipal water system.16  Others 
live in rural communities where lead can enter the human environment through mining.17 
Lead poisoning is irreversible, and no level of lead exposure is safe.18  Lead is a neurotoxin 
which, even at low levels, can cause damage to children in the domains of cognition, behavior and 
executive functioning.19  The only way to protect a child from harm is to prevent exposure.20    
 The most common cognitive injury left by childhood lead poisoning is a decrease in IQ.21  A 
reduced IQ “increases the need for enrollment in special education services, reduces the likelihood of 
                                                          
16 See Benfer, supra, at 6-7, 13-14; Terrence McCoy, Lead Poisoning is ‘Toxic Legacy’ that Still Haunts Freddie Gray’s 
Baltimore, WASHINGTON POST (5/1/2015) (quoting Saul E. Kerpelman, a Baltimore lawyer specializing in lead 
poisoning litigation as saying that “Nearly 99.9 percent of my clients were black”). 
17 See Benfer, supra, at 6-7. 
18  CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS FOR 
CHILDREN AFFECTED BY LEAD 1 (April 2015).) 
19 See David C. Bellinger, Very Low Lead Exposures and Children’s Neurodevelopment, 20 CURR. OPIN. PEDIATR. 172 
(2008); Kim M. Dietrich, Caleb M. Adler, James C. Eliassen, and Bruce P. Lanphear, Childhood Lead Exposure Causes 
Permanent Brain Damage, SCIENCE DAILY, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/12/091201084152.htm 
(Dec. 2, 2009). 
20 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN 
AFFECTED BY LEAD 1-2 (April 2015). 
21 Bruce P. Lanphear, Richard Hornung, Jane Khoury, Kimberly Yolton, Peter Baghurst, David C. Bellinger, Low-Level 
Environmental Lead Exposure and Children’s Intellectual Function: An International Pooled Analysis, 113 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 894 (2005).  The decrease can be present even when the amount of lead 
measured in the child’s blood is quite low.  Id.; Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Educational Interventions for Children Affected by Lead 3-4 (April 2015) (“Recent epidemiologic studies 
and quantitative reviews suggest that there is no discernible threshold for lead effects on IQ”).  IQ scores are 
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high school and college graduation, [and] lowers lifetime earnings (both through educational and IQ 
pathways)….”22   Children with low IQ usually encounter difficulty with learning to read, although literacy 
can be achieved literacy if they receive an unusual level of educational intervention.23 
Behavioral challenges are also common among children exposed to lead, including “impulsivity, 
aggression, and short attention span.”24  In a lawsuit filed on behalf of lead-exposed children in Flint, for 
example, nine of the 15 named plaintiffs were described as having symptoms of attention deficit 
disorder.25  Eight were described as engaging in fights at school or exhibiting aggressive or disruptive 
behaviors, and eight had been suspended or expelled from school.26 Lead poisoning is associated with 
increased odds of a diagnosis of conduct disorder, an increased risk of not finishing high school, and 
criminal behavior.27  Freddie Gray and his sisters all had trouble at school and were diagnosed with 
                                                          
correlated with differences in school achievement as well as, to a smaller degree, job performance.  American 
Psychological Association Task Force, Intelligence:  Knowns and Unknowns, 51 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 77 (1996). 
22 Elise Gould, Childhood Lead Poisoning: Conservative Estimates of the Social and Economic Benefits of Lead 
Hazard Control, 117 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1162 (2009); David C. Bellinger, Very low lead exposures and 
children’s neurodevelopment, 20 CURRENT OPINION IN PEDIATRICS 172 (2008). 
23 See Jill H. Allor, Patricia G. Mathes, J. Kyle Roberts, Jennifer P. Cheatham and Stephanie Al Otaiba, Is Scientifically 
Based Reading Instruction Effective for Students With Below-Average IQs?, 80 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 287 (2014). 
24 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS FOR 
CHILDREN AFFECTED BY LEAD 6 (April 2015). 
25 D.R. et al. v. Michigan Department of Education et al., ED-MI-0007, Docket / Court, 2:16-cv-13694-AJT-APP (E.D. 
Mich.) ¶¶90-348.  
26 D.R. et al. v. Michigan Department of Education et al., ED-MI-0007, Docket / Court, 2:16-cv-13694-AJT-APP (E.D. 
Mich.) ¶¶90-348. 
27 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS FOR 
CHILDREN AFFECTED BY LEAD 6-7, 12 (April 2015). 
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ADHD or ADD.28  Freddie Gray did not finish high school and was involved frequently in criminal 
conduct.29  He described one of his sisters as being “the aggressive one.  She like to fight all the time.”30 
Of particular importance to a person’s decision to sell periodic payments under a structured 
settlement are problems with executive functioning.  Many lead-poisoned children experience particular 
problems with regard to “higher level” functions of planning and problem solving.31  A Baltimore “lead 
kid” named Rose, profiled in an article in the Washington Post, sold structured settlement payments 
totaling over half a million dollars for a lump sum of $63,000.32  Her understanding of the transaction, 
apparently based on a brief telephone consultation with a lawyer referred to her by the factoring 
                                                          




31 Richard L. Canfield, Matthew H. Gendle, and Deborah A. Cory-Slechta, Impaired Neuropsychological Functioning 
in Lead-Exposed Children, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 513 (2004).  Executive functioning, as explained by 
two experts in the field, has multiple aspects: 
 [T]here exists a relative agreement in terms of the complexity and importance of executive 
functioning to human adaptive behavior.  In a constantly changing environment, executive 
abilities allow us to shift our mind set quickly and adapt to diverse situations while at the same 
time inhibiting inappropriate behaviors. They enable us to create a plan, initiate its execution, 
and persevere on the task at hand until its completion. Executive functions mediate the ability to 
organize our thoughts in a goal directed way and are therefore essential for success in school and 
work situations, as well as everyday living. 
Maria Beatriz Jurado & Monica Rosselli, The Elusive Nature of Executive Functions: A Review of our Current 
Understanding, 17 NEUROPSYCH. REV. 213 (2007); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN AFFECTED BY LEAD 5, 12 (April 2015).  
32 Terrence McCoy, Cashing in off Poor Lead-Poisoning Victims, WASH. POST (8/26/2015). 
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company, was that she “was selling some checks in the distant future for some quick money, right?”33  
Rose had no plans for using the lump sum she received in exchange for the income stream, but she 
trusted the representative of the factoring company because he was nice to her, took her out to dinner 
and guaranteed a vacation for the family.34   
Executive functioning problems are also likely to be among the most important areas of 
cognitive injury in terms of their impact on a person’s capacity to make a reasoned judgment about 
whether to sell benefits under a structured settlement.  As explained by two experts in the field,  
 [T]here exists a relative agreement in terms of the complexity and importance of 
executive functioning to human adaptive behavior.  In a constantly changing 
environment, executive abilities allow us to shift our mind set quickly and adapt to 
diverse situations while at the same time inhibiting inappropriate behaviors. They 
enable us to create a plan, initiate its execution, and persevere on the task at hand until 
its completion. Executive functions mediate the ability to organize our thoughts in a goal 
directed way and are therefore essential for success in school and work situations, as 
well as everyday living.35 
Dysfunction in executive functioning, therefore, leaves a person vulnerable when confronting a 
new situation, making long-term plans and carrying them out, regardless of how much information or 
advice the person may receive.   For people who suffer from impaired executive functioning, making 
decisions deliberately, identifying a suitable goal and accomplishing it are highly unlikely.        
 
Section Two:  Structured Settlements 
Injuries caused by childhood lead poisoning can affect a person’s capacity to earn a living.  
Therefore, when a suit for damages is filed on behalf of a lead-poisoned child, the child is examined to 
determine whether and by how much the child’s eventual earning capacity is likely to decline because of 
the lead poisoning.  For example, if the lead poisoning left the child with a reduced IQ, an inability to 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Maria Beatriz Jurado & Monica Rosselli, The Elusive Nature of Executive Functions: A Review of our Current 
Understanding, 17 NEUROPSYCH. REV. 213 (2007). 
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comprehend written material, emotional explosiveness or poor executive functioning, the child’s 
capacity to earn a living will be diminished as compared with what the child could have earned in the 
absence of experiencing those types of neurological injuries.  Determining the nature of the child’s 
neurological harm and its likely impact on the child’s capacities as an adult usually requires neurological, 
psychological, medical or vocational expertise.36   
Where a tort suit on behalf of a poisoned child is successful against a landlord or other person 
responsible for the child’s exposure, damages can be awarded for the economic loss the child will 
experience over a lifetime spent with a reduced capacity for self-support.  Damages can be paid in a 
lump sum or periodically over an extended period of time.  The latter is called a structured settlement.37  
During the child’s minority, the child is entitled to support from the child’s parents.  Any damages 
awarded for lost income-earning capacity, therefore, should be invested until the child reaches the age 
of majority and loses the right to be supported by the child’s parents.  At the point when the child 
reaches the age of majority and becomes responsible for his or her own support, the damages awarded 
for lost income-earning capacity can be spent for the person’s support.   
                                                          
36 See, e.g., Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith, 446 Md. 611, 624 (2016) (quoting from report of pediatrician about impact 
of childhood lead poisoning on plaintiff’s cognitive and educational problems resulting in probable loss of capacity 
for self-support); Levitas v. Jeffers, No. 2180 SEPT. TERM 2014, 2015 WL 9306757 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 21, 
2015), cert. denied, 447 Md. 299 (2016) (reliance on expert witness to establish likely economic losses that children 
will experience over their lifetimes because of lead poisoning); La Fountaine ex rel. Currie v. Franzese, 282 A.D.2d 
935, 940, 724 N.Y.S.2d 514, 519 (2001) (evidence of vocational economic analyst allowed to establish future lost 
earnings of child with lead poisoning); Lewin Realty III, Inc. v Brooks, 138 Md. App. 244 (2001), aff’d sub nom. 
Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (2003). 
37 NATIONAL STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT:  FINANCIAL SECURITY AFTER A CHILD’S 
ACCIDENT (2011); see Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring?  The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 
WIS. L. REV. 859, 864 (discussing history of structured settlements); Ellen S. Pryor, After the Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1757 (2002) (discussing history of structured settlements).  Other elements of damages can include the medical 
costs, etc., incurred by parents. 
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Ordinarily, once a person reaches the age of majority, any asset the person owns leaves the 
control of the person’s parent or other guardian and comes under the control of the person.  That 
includes an award of damages, whether that award is in the form of a lump sum or in the form of a 
structured settlement.38 
If the award is in the form of a structured settlement, the now adult recipient will be paid a 
periodic stipend for a number of years or for the lifetime of the recipient.  Factoring companies have an 
interest in buying the stream of payments for two reasons.  First, the factoring company pays the 
recipient a sum of cash that is usually far below the value of the payments over time or even a 
significant percentage of the present discounted value of the payments.  Second, the factoring company 
acquires the same favorable tax treatment for the structured settlement as that settlement had in the 
hands of its intended recipient; therefore, the value of the investment is higher than a similar 
investment which is subject to the usual taxation rules.  
Congress extended favorable tax treatment to structured settlements in order to encourage tort 
victims to prefer them over a lump sum.39  Congress may preferred the structured settlements to a lump 
                                                          
38 See Alanna Ritchie, Minors and Structured Settlements, ANNUITY.ORG, http://www.annuity.org/structured-
settlements/minors; Ellen S. Pryor, Liability for Inchoate and Future Loss after Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757 (2002) 
(questioning appropriateness of turning over all control of a structured settlement when the payee reaches 
majority because the financial judgment of an 18 or 19-year old may be questionable).   
39 26 U.S.C. § 5891.  Favorable tax treatment of structured settlements is thought to encourage provident use of 
tort damage awards by people who might use a lump sum award unwisely, forfeit financial security and risk 
becoming dependent on public benefits such as Medicaid or Supplemental Security Income.  See Kelly McGann, It’s 
My Money and I Want It Now, Your Honor, 48 MD. BAR J. 36 (2015); Henry E. Smith, Structured Settlements as 
Structures of Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1962-1967 (2002)(explaining tax and bankruptcy benefits of the structured 
settlement and characterizing the favorable tax treatment as a bargain between the government and the recipient 
of tort damages who elects not to take the lump sum); Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring?  The Market 
in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859, 867-69 (discussing history of favorable tax treatment of 
structured settlements). 
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sum for several reasons.  The most common rationale is that recipients of a lump sum are thought to be 
inclined toward squandering the asset, rather than providently investing it for long-term support.40  
Another rationale is that an injured person is likely to qualify for means-tested public benefits unless the 
person has an alternative source of income.  Because a recipient of a lump sum settlement may use the 
funds improvidently, the stream of income provided by a structured settlement protects the state 
against the cost of means-tested public benefits, such as SSI, MA, cash assistance and SNAP.   No 
concern seems to have been expressed for parents, but the income stream under a structured 
settlement can also protect the recipient’s parents from having to provide financial support after the 
recipient reaches the age of majority.  That responsibility is both moral and legal.41 
Although Congress adopted favorable tax treatment in order to give tort recipients an incentive 
to accept a structured settlement rather than a lump sum, Congress did not prohibit tort recipients from 
conveying the favorable tax treatment upon the sale of a structured settlement.  Instead, in 2002, 
Congress amended the law to explicitly permit the conveyance of the favorable tax treatment in cases 
where a state court must finds that the sale is in the [quote exact language] best interests of the seller 
and the seller’s dependents.42   
                                                          
40 The argument that structured settlement payees are likely to squander a lump sum has been viewed with 
skepticism.  See Laura J. Koenig, Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics?  Structured Settlements, Factoring, and the 
Federal Government, 82 IND. L. REV. 809 (2007); Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring?  The Market in Tort 
Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859, 869-874; However persuasive in some circumstances, the skepticism 
seems misplaced with respect to a young adult who lives in poverty and whose childhood lead poisoning caused 
such harm in the realms of cognition, executive functioning and behavior that the payee’s capacity for self-support 
has been severely reduced or totally eliminated.  
41 MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW §§13-101 – 13-109. 
42 26 U.S.C. § 5891 (in absence of a state court finding that the sale is in the best interest of the payee, the 
transferee is subject to a 40% excise tax on the transfer as well as the loss of favorable tax treatment for the 
income earned by the principal under the annuity contract); see Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring?  
The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859, 869  (discussing impact of favorable tax treatment on 
the value of a structured settlement to the defendant in the tort suit and to an investor; “whatever its source, the 
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Section 3:  Alternative Approaches to Banning Sales of  
Structured Settlements by Lead-Poisoned Sellers 
Alternative 1:  Treat the Sale of a Structured Settlement the Same as Other Contracts by 
Eliminating the Favorable Tax Treatment and the Judicial Review  
The usual rule in contracts is that willing buyers and sellers may make whatever deals they agree 
to, however prudent or “im.”  The limited constraints on the capacity to contract include, for example, 
situations where a person is deemed incapable of acting autonomously or where a party has 
manipulated the transaction in a manner deemed grossly unfair.  For example, minors43 and persons 
under guardianship44 cannot enter into enforceable contracts, and contracts with people experiencing 
incapacity in some measure may be voidable.45   Contracts may not be enforced where a party demands 
an unconscionable term,46 or where one party owes the other a special duty of care.47   
In the case of a sale of an income stream payable under a structured settlement, most states 
have an exception from the usual rule where the structured settlement was entered in a worker’s 
                                                          
effect of this drive [toward structured settlements] has been a largely unacknowledged transfer of tort liability 
from tort defendants to plaintiffs and the federal Treasury”). 
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2)(a)-(b) (1981) (minors and persons under guardianship lack capacity to 
assent to contract). 
44 Id. 
45 See Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, 1 Williston on Contracts § 10:8 (4th ed. 1990); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 12(2)(c) (1981) (includes within category of persons incapable of entering into a contract persons who 
are “mentally ill or defective”). 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (“If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the 
contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without 
the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any 
unconscionable result.”) 
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981) (undue influence renders contract voidable). 
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compensation claim.48  In other words, if a seller agrees to sell an income stream awarded in a worker’s 
compensation case, the agreement is unenforceable in most states.  The question for this subpart, 
therefore, is whether the prohibition on sales of structured settlements arising out of worker’s 
compensation claims is the right model for sales of structured settlements arising out of childhood lead 
poisoning cases.  
Similarities between structured settlements in workers compensation cases and childhood lead 
poisoning cases are important.  In both, the stream of payments is a substitute for the income that the 
recipient would earn but for the injury that gives rise to the settlement.  Also, in the absence of the 
stream of income, both kinds of recipients face the risk of extreme poverty.  The state, community and 
family, therefore, are at risk of having to provide support to the recipient if the stream of income is 
unavailable.  In both situations, further, the possibility of acquiring a relatively secure investment with 
an excellent return gives the buyer a strong incentive to exploit any weaknesses of the seller. 
Whether a seller is likely to be exploitable is a key distinction.  A person may receive worker’s 
compensation for any injury related to employment; the injury need not be one that affects the 
worker’s cognition or executive functioning in a way that may reduce the worker’s capacity to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of an offer to sell the income stream.  That is not true where the seller’s income 
stream arises out of childhood lead poisoning that left the seller incapable of self-support.  That seller, 
as described earlier, is far less likely than most people to have the capacity to make a reasoned 
judgment about selling an income stream and perhaps more likely to fall for an exploitative pitch by a 
potential buyer.  Given that reality, the case for banning the sale is even stronger in childhood lead 
poisoning cases than in worker’s compensation cases. 
Another important distinction may push in the opposite direction.  The structured settlement is 
entered in a worker’s compensation case only if the injured worker has agreed to accept a stream of 
payments in lieu of a lump sum.  The worker, therefore, has one opportunity to take a lump sum and 
decides not to do so.  The subsequent constraint on sale means that the worker is denied a chance to 
second guess the initial judgment, but the initial judgment was the worker’s to be made.  Where a 
structured settlement is entered in a childhood lead poisoning case, on the other hand, the decision is 
                                                          
48 See David B. Torrey, Compromise Settlements under State Workers’ Compensation Acts: Law, Policy, Practice, 
and Ten Years of the Pennsylvania Experience, 16 WIDENER L.J. 199, 380-83 (2007) (discussing limits on sales of 
structured settlements by recipients of worker’s compensation award). 
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typically made by a parent on behalf of a minor child.  It is only when the child reaches the age of 
majority that the recipient has the opportunity to forego a lump sum in lieu of a regular income stream.  
Given the neurological harms that justified the tort judgment, however, the distinction should not be 
viewed as determinative.  Further, allowing the now adult recipient to second-guess the judgment of the 
parent can have costs for the parent, including the duty, sometimes legally enforced, to provide support 
for the adult disabled child if that person sells the structured settlement income stream and fails to 
generate a substitute stream of income with the lump sum.     
The buyer’s temptation toward exploitation must be understood in light of the value of the 
purchase.  The buyer is acquiring an income stream funded by a defendant who has purchased an 
annuity from an insurance company.  The income stream is, therefore, quite secure.   Some doubt is 
possible, of course, if the income stream terminates upon the death of the payee rather than after a 
period of years.  If that happens, a buyer may get less than a full return on the investment.  For example, 
if the structured settlement in the Gray case terminated upon his death, investors who bought the rights 
to his income streams may have lost money because he died within a year of the sale.  Without more 
data on how many sellers die before the investor has recouped the investment, it’s not known how 
speculative the investment is.  In the meantime, buyers point to the risk of premature death of the 
payee as an important reason for paying a relatively low price for the payment stream.   
The value of the purchase turns on two calculations:  the difference between the total amount 
of payments and the present value of the payments over time, and the lump sum paid by the seller as a 
kind of loan, which can be represented by an interest rate.  Maryland’s Attorney General examined the 
interest rate on transactions between 2013 and 2015, and found a range from a low of 8.5 percent to a 
high of 25 percent.49   During that time, banks were paying interest of less than 1 percent, so investing in 
the purchase of structured settlement benefits promised a good rate of return, despite the risk of 
premature death of the seller.50 
                                                          
49 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement 
Spreadsheet (2016). 
50 A New York Court commented critically on the risk/return issue in one of the early cases involving judicial 
approval of a structured settlement sale in a case where the petition was denied:   
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Investing in a structured settlement income stream includes a third valuable feature:  favorable 
tax treatment.  During the time the money remains in the annuity, its gain is not taxed.  This is an 
exception from the usual rule that gains made on investments are taxed in the year the gain is realized. 
The periodic stipend, once paid, is taxed as ordinary income.  For the favorable tax treatment to 
accompany the sale of the structured settlement income stream, a state court must approve the 
transaction as being in the best interests of the seller and the seller’s dependents.  If the transaction is 
not approved, the sale is subject to an excise tax of 40 percent. 
Investors who buy structured settlement benefits and the factoring companies that set up the 
transactions understand that much of the value of the investment turns on the favorable tax treatment.  
Therefore, transactions are rarely entered into without judicial approval.  The reality, then, is that these 
transactions do not follow the usual contract rule, allowing enforcement of most provisions agreed to by 
a willing seller and a willing buyer.  Those usual rules are bent to accommodate the buyer’s need to get 
judicial approval, a process that should, at least in theory, provide some protection for the seller against 
improvidently entering into a transaction that does not serve the best interests of the seller or the 
seller’s dependents.   
Examining the deficits of the judicial approval process is the subject of the next section.  What 
seems clear from an examination of petitions in Maryland over a three-year period is that judges do not 
                                                          
[18%] is clearly a very high rate for a secured investment. The petitioner attempts to justify it 
through an affidavit from a senior vice president, David Reape, who compares it with credit cards 
charges from several banks. Credit cards, however, are unsecured. Even the minimal security 
provided by a motor vehicle—a depreciating asset subject to accidental damage which must be 
located and repossessed, often with judicial assistance—is sufficient to make car loans much less 
costly than credit card debt. The petitioner is buying an obligation to pay a given sum on a given 
date, entered into by a company previously determined to be adequately capitalized and 
competently managed. This is as secure as any commercial instrument can possibly be, and there 
is no obvious justification for treating it as equivalent to a consumer's unsecured promise to keep 
a revolving credit account current.   
In re 321 Henderson Receivables Ltd. P'ship, 2 Misc. 3d 463, 465, 769 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
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see their role as protective.51  Instead, it appears that most judges are convinced that respect for 
freedom of contract is the correct answer when lead-poisoned recipients of a structured settlement 
seek to sell their benefits, so only pro forma examination is needed when the court examines a petition 
to approve a sale.52   
The Maryland Attorney General’s office identified a total of 132 petitions between 2013 and 
2015 in which the petitioner sought approval for the sale of all or some payments from an income 
stream under a structured settlement where the petitioner had a tort judgment based on settlement 
awarded because of childhood lead poisoning.  Of these, 119 were granted, two were denied, and the 
remainder were dismissed by the petitioner.   
The success rate might be explained by the persuasiveness of the sellers’ statements about their 
plans for spending the lump sum to resolve debts, buy a house, get an education or open a business.  
Given the known cognitive, emotional and behavioral limitations of the sellers, those explanations are 
unlikely to be credible, even if offered.  As explained below, few petitions suggest that the seller was 
planning to make good long-term use of the lump sum or that the seller could carry through on a long-
term plan if one were made. 
The success rate might also be explained by the skillful counsel for the factoring companies who 
made sure that the law was followed punctiliously, and that each and every petition was persuasive in 
every respect.  That explanation also seems unlikely, however, in view of the suit by the Attorney 
General’s office about the collusion between the companies and the theoretically independent advisor 
with whom the petitioners consulted.  In addition, in at least one of the cases in which the petition was 
                                                          
51 State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured 
Settlement Spreadsheet (2016). 
52 See In re Rains, 473 S.W.3d 461 (Tex. App. 2015) (“A contract is a bargain struck by two or more individuals or 
entities. It encompasses the rights and obligations which the parties are willing to accept. And, to the extent that 
they struck the bargain, the bargain is theirs to modify. While a court is empowered to construe the respective 
rights and obligations of those parties under their agreement, it is not a party to the agreement. Nor does it have 
the inherent authority to modify or rewrite that agreement on behalf of the parties.”)  
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denied, the court issued a written opinion in which the court identified multiple flaws in the petition 
that made granting it both technically and substantively inappropriate.53   
What is more likely is that, in the 119 cases in which the petition was granted, the judge was 
relying on an untested allegiance to freedom of contract:  regardless of the prudence of the deal, an 
adult should be allowed to agree to it.  Prior to changes in the rules in late 2015, the judges were 
unlikely to meet the petitioner in the courtroom.  Petitions could be filed in any circuit court and were 
typically filed in a jurisdiction far from the petitioner’s home.  Judges therefore rarely saw the petitioner 
and had no first-hand basis to determine whether the petitioner was capable of exercising an acceptable 
level of self-management and financial judgment.54  Further, under the earlier version of the rules, the 
court was not required to consider whether any independent examination into the petitioner’s cognitive 
capacity was necessary. 
Assuming that the petitioner’s capacity were not in question, freedom of contract should still be 
questionable because it is unlikely that petitioners could be adequately educated about the nature of 
the transaction.  In other words, no matter what rules are in place mandating fair disclosure about 
terms, few petitioners with unimpaired cognitive capacity would fully understand what is being sold and 
how the price is determined.55  It follows that even fewer petitioners with impaired capacity can fully 
understand the deal they are entering into. 
                                                          
53 In re Wilson, No. 310601V, 2009 WL 1569730 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 22, 2009); see Kelly McGann, It’s My Money and I 
Want It Now, Your Honor, 48-JUN MD. B.J. 36 (2015). 
54 All but a few of the 132 petitions were filed by petitioners under the age of 30.  Thirty-three petitioners were age 
17, 18 or 19.  Whether youthful immaturity and impulsivity, as well as the consequences of lead poisoning should 
be a factor in capacity in these cases is something that is intriguing, but beyond the scope of this paper.   
55 See Michelle M. Marcellus, Resolving the Modern Day Esau Problem Among Structured Settlement Recipients, 40 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 517, 541 (2011) (opacity of financial concepts in structured settlement sales makes them close to 
impossible to understand); Daniel W. Hindert and Craig H. Ulman, Transfers of Structured Settlement Payment 
Rights:  What Judges Should Know about Structured Settlement Protection Acts, 44 No. 2 JUDGES’ J. 19, 24-25 (2005) 
(explaining the complex information and calculations necessary for a court to evaluate whether a price is fair). 
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The first step in determining the value of the sale is to determine how much principal would be 
needed to generate the promised payments over the term of the payout.  That amount is called the 
“discounted present value.”  Whether that amount is accurate in any particular case is problematic.  
Some settlements promise payments for life, which is an undeterminable period of time, and others 
promise payments for a period of years, so identifying the amount of principal differs depending on the 
terms of the structured settlement.  Nor is it possible to know exactly how much income a particular 
amount of principal will earn in the future, since interest rates vary from time to time.  Using 
standardized projections created for other transactions may be helpful, but those projections may not 
be pertinent to the situation of a young person living in inner-city Baltimore.    
The second step is identifying the discount rate the investor will charge.  In other words, 
investors do not pay the seller the “present discounted value” of the payments that are being sold.  
Instead, that amount is further discounted.  The Attorney General’s study revealed discount rates 
ranging from a low of 8.5 percent to a high of 25 percent.56  The discount rate is the equivalent of the 
annual interest rate being paid by the seller on the lump sum paid by the buyer.   
People with significant education and investment experience may find this explanation difficult 
to follow.  The petitions described in the Attorney General’s docket study demonstrate that calculations 
of the “present discounted value” and the “discount rate” are subject to considerable differences that 
may lack any explanation other than what a particular seller will accept.  For example, two sellers 
petitioned to sell payments worth approximately $500,000.  In one case involving a 23-year-old seller in 
2013, the present discounted value of the payments was $350,399.80, the discount rate was 8.47% and 
the cash paid to the seller was $63,935.04. 57   In the second, involving a 24-year-old seller in 2014, the 
present discounted value of the payments was $290,909.38, the discount rate was 9.86% and the cash 
                                                          
56 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement 
Spreadsheet (2016). 
57 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement 
Spreadsheet (2016) at 1 (Petition of Christopher Green). 
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paid to the seller was $46,510.05.58  Three cases involving payments worth approximately $300,000 
showed similar variability.  In one, involving an 18-year-old seller in 2014, the present discounted value 
of the payments was $243,843.78, the discount rate was 11.44% and the cash paid to the seller was 
$33,000.00.59  In the second, involving a 19-year-old seller in 2014, the present discounted value of the 
payments was $229,748.83, the discount rate was 15.59% and the cash paid to the seller was $64,000.60  
In the third, involving a 19-year-old seller in 2015, the present discounted value was $198,167.16, the 
discount rate was 11.82% and the cash paid to the seller was $16,000.00.61  Transfers of payments 
worth $100,000 or less are also common and show similar variability.  In one sale, involving a 20-year-
old in 2014, the present discounted value was $83,424.98, the discount rate was 25.22% and the cash 
                                                          
58 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured 
Settlement Spreadsheet (2016) at 5 (Petition of Michael Barber). 
59 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured 
Settlement Spreadsheet (2016) at 3 (Petition of Brian Stokes). 
60 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured 
Settlement Spreadsheet (2016) at 5 (Petition of Tyrell Dowery).  Interestingly, the petitioner’s twin, 
whose payments were worth $500 more, ended up with the same cash payment.  Id. at 5 (Petition of 
Tyree Dowery). 
61 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement 
Spreadsheet (2016) at 8 (Petition of Tyrell Dowery).  The amount of payments sold at the same time by Tyrell 
Dowery’s twin was worth approximately $500 less, but both ended up with the same cash payment.  Id. at 8 
(Petition of Tyree Dowery). 
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paid to the seller was $36,400.00.62  In another, involving a 20-year-old in 2015, the present discounted 
value was $75,758.91, the discount rate was 16.58% and the cash paid to the seller was $31,681.77. 
Revisions in 2016 to Maryland’s Structured Settlement Protection Act support consumer 
protections by requiring additional disclosures and adding provisions for enhancing the independence of 
the financial advice offered to petitioners.63  Given the complexity of the transactions and the 
vulnerability of lead-poisoned petitioners, however, whether such provisions will help petitioners better 
protect their interests unclear.   Further, consumer protection is about protecting the ideal of freedom 
of contract, making sure that both parties to the transaction have access to important information and 
can use that information to make choices.  The relevance of that ideal is limited where the seller has 
known limitations, the buyer is subject to a temptation toward exploitation is predictable, and 
taxpayers, communities and families are stuck with the bill if the seller fails to use the lump sum to 
generate an alternative source of support.    
Traditional freedom of contract turns on respect for the right of the individual to exercise his or 
her autonomy, regardless of whether one party is exercising great judgment and, within limits, 
regardless of whether the party is tempted to engage in unscrupulous conduct.  What is important in 
the context of the sales at issue here is that a key to the benefit the buyer wants is favorable tax 
treatment for the investment.  So taxpayers subsidize the transactions even though, after the 
transaction, taxpayers may also subsidize the seller through the provision of public benefits.  Once the 
favorable tax treatment feature is removed from the transaction, fewer buyers, if any, would be 
tempted to exploit the seller’s weaknesses in order to obtain the seller’s consent.  Even if the seller’s 
                                                          
62 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured 
Settlement Spreadsheet (2016) at 4 (Petition of Jassmyn Chase). 
63 Consumer protection provisions appear in statutes in other states as well.  The California statute, for example, 
requires that the petitioner be advised about how to make a report if the petitioner believes he or she was 
“treated unfairly or misled as to the nature of the obligations you assumed upon entering into this agreement.  
CAL. INS. CODE §10136(c)(12).  Also, a copy of the petition must be filed with the Attorney General.  CAL. INS. 
CODE §10139(a). 
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autonomy were constrained by a prohibition on sales, the constraint is no greater than what occurs in 
worker’s compensation cases.  Further, the parent’s effort to assure that the child enjoys some financial 
security as an adult would be actualized.  Finally, banning sales would also protect the community and 
the taxpayer from having to support a seller who enjoys the benefits of a regular income stream.     
 
Alternative 2:  Allow a Lead-Poisoned Recipient of a Structure d Settlement to Sell Income Stream 
and Favorable Tax Treatment after Review by a State Court 
The argument that the recipient of a structured settlement should have the usual freedom of 
contract was rejected by Congress when it amended the tax law in 2002 to deny recipients the right to 
transfer the favorable tax treatment of the structured settlement unless a state court found the sale to 
be in the best interest of the payee and the payee’s dependents.64  Justifying this constraint on freedom 
of contract of a lead-poisoned recipient of a structured settlement depends, in part, on whether the 
state protective statutes in fact protect a lead-poisoned recipient against deals that do not serve the 
best interests of the seller or the seller’s dependents. The Maryland Structured Settlement Protection 
Law and the pertinent sections of the state’s procedural rules are typical in many ways of state statutes 
adopted to comply with the federal tax law and will be the focus of the analysis here.   
                                                          
64 See Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring?  The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859, 
920-21 (describing the tension between the paternalism goal of Congress in enacting favorable tax treatment 
versus the “traditional respect for individual autonomy” of the seller); Daniel W. Hindert and Craig H. Ulman, 
Transfers of Structured Settlement Payment Rights:  What Judges Should Know about Structured Settlement 
Protection Acts, 44 No. 2 JUDGES’ J. 19, 20 (2005) (describing early adoptions of states “Structured Settlement 
Protection Act”); Michael Charles Sullivan, Exemption from the Common Fate: Refuge for Individual Debtors 
Trapped by Structured Settlements, Factoring Companies, and the Bankruptcy Code In Georgia, 49 GA. L. REV. 576, 
586-87 (2015) (describing development and terms of state Structured Settlement Protection Acts); Jeremy 
Babener, Justifying the Structured Settlement Tax Subsidy: The Use of Lump Sum Settlement Monies, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& BUS. 127 (2009) (same). 
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When favored tax treatment of structured settlements was first adopted in 1982, Congress 
appears to have had two goals.65  First, Congress wanted to encourage tort claimants to accept 
payments over time rather than a lump sum to avoid the temptation of “prematurely dissipating” the 
funds.66  Second, it wanted to avoid providing means-tested public benefits for tort claimants who 
would have been able to support themselves had they not prematurely dissipated a lump sum award.67  
In other words, Congress appears to have decided to forego tax revenue in order to avoid a predictable 
demand for tax-funded benefits later on.  When Congress agreed to allow the transfer of favorable tax 
treatment in 2002, there was no indication that the goals underlying the favorable tax treatment had 
changed.  Instead, Congress apparently decided to rely on state courts to prevent transfers in situations 
where the seller’s best interests were not protected, such as in cases where premature dissipation 
would occur.68 
A tort claimant whose childhood lead poisoning results in the loss of all or some of the capacity 
for self-support is a poster child for the arguments in favor of a structured settlement.  At the time the 
tort claim is settled with a structured settlement, the parent, acting for the minor, can predict with a 
                                                          
65 The legislative history is obscure, but it is fair to deduce these goals.  See Jeremy Babener, Structured 
Settlements and Single-Claimant Qualified Settlement Funds: Regulating in Accordance with Structured Settlement 
History, 13 LEG. & PUB. POL. 1 (2010); Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring?  The Market in Tort Claims Has 
Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859.  
66 Babener, supra note **, at 3.  
67 Babener, supra note **, at 3. 
68 See In re Settlement Capital Corp. (In re Richard C. Ballos), 769 N.Y.S.2d 817, 1 Misc.3d 446 (Sup. Ct. 2003) 
(“[T]his Court finds that the ‘best interest’ standard under the SSPA requires a case by case analysis to determine 
whether the proposed transfer of structured settlement payments, which were designed to preserve the injured 
person's long-term financial security, will provide needed financial rescue without jeopardizing or irreparably 
impairing the financial security afforded to the payee and his or her dependents by the periodic payments.”); 
Corrie Erickson, Chapter 593:  A Structure for the Transfer of Structured Settlements, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 667 
(2010).  
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high degree of confidence that, when the child reaches adulthood, he or she will lack the usual degree of 
judgment about financial matters because of low IQ, coupled with full or partial illiteracy.  Further, the 
predictable impulsivity and poor executive functioning that result from lead-poisoning mean, in all 
likelihood, that the adult will be unable to turn a lump sum into an investment that supports financial 
security.  Instead, the payee is likely to spend the lump sum on plans that cannot be realized and on 
other goods and services that will not yield a source of ongoing support.69  If the parent wants the child 
to have a source of financial security during adulthood, therefore, the best solution is a structured 
settlement or some other arrangement that prevents access to the principal, such as a trust.70  The 
alternative is to allow the child, as an adult, to use up the principal and become dependent on public 
benefits, coupled with parental support. 
Judicial concern about premature dissipation of a lump sum payment is a common theme in 
cases that deny petitions for the sale of structured settlement payments.71  In Maryland, the only 
published opinion of a court denying a petition for approval of a sale details the experience of Quintel 
Wilson who, over the course of four years, in multiple transactions, sold payments totaling close to 
                                                          
69 Cf. In re Riddell, 138 Wash. App. 485, as amended on reconsideration (2007) (parent attempted to protect child 
from herself by modifying trust into a special needs trust instead of directly giving the child the principal because 
daughter was bipolar and schizophrenic and could not make her own financial decisions or live unassisted). 
70 Ellen S. Pryor, Liability for Inchoate and Future Loss after Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1774-75 (2002). 
71 Empirical evidence for the squandering plaintiff claim may be problematic.  See Adam F. Scales, Against 
Settlement Factoring?  The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859; Ellen S. Pryor, Liability for 
Inchoate and Future Loss after Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1779-81 (2002); Jeremy Babener, Justifying the 
Structured Settlement Tax Subsidy: The Use of Lump Sum Settlement Monies, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 127 (2009) 
(examining data about dissipation of lump sum judgments and concluding that evidence is incomplete and 
unpersuasive).  But see Scott Hankins, Mark Hoekstra and Paige Marta Skiba, The Ticket to Easy Street?  The 
Financial Consequences of Winning the Lottery, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 961 (2011) (lottery winners went bankrupt 
only a few years after others in poor economic conditions and most did not use winnings to pay off debt or 
increase equity in secured assets). 
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$700,000 in exchange for lump sums totaling less than $200,000.  According to his petitions, one 
purpose for selling his benefits was to invest in a parking lot business, but no progress seems to have 
been made on that goal.  Mr. Wilson also said that he needed money for daily living, including paying 
tuition and rent, buying furniture and a used car, paying off debt and having an emergency fund.  In 
another petition, his plan was to buy a house.  When questioned by the Court considering the next 
petition, Mr. Wilson said that all of the money had been spent on other things and that he still needed 
money for a business now described as including parking lots and used car sales.72  
A 21-year-old petitioner in New York, according to the court that denied the petition,   
wanted the money to open a barber shop. However, he had no knowledge of the 
licensing requirements for a barber shop, had not investigated the cost of the necessary 
merchandise, and had not located a suitable space. The figures which Mr. Martinez had 
included in his affidavit had no basis in fact, and he himself had little more than an 
acquaintance who was a barber. That person, while identified by Mr. Martinez by name, 
declined to appear in court to discuss the potential of a business opportunity. Nor was 
Mr. Martinez able to develop a concrete plan or even locate a viable storefront, despite 
repeated adjournments and some assistance from counsel.”73  
                                                          
72 In re Petition of Quintel Wilson, 2009 WL 1569730 (Md. Cir. Ct.). 
73 Petition of 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v. Martinez, 11 Misc. 3d 892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).  Whether Mr. 
Martinez was lead-poisoned was not revealed in the opinion, but it is a possibility since the structured settlement 
arose out of a suit brought by his mother during his minority.  See also Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC 
v. Hall, 43 Misc. 3d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (20-year old recipient of a structured settlement received an initial 
payment of approximately $200,000, which she spent in a little over a year in a variety of ways, none of which 
contributed to her capacity to earn a living.  She loaned $15,000 to people who never paid her back, spent $60,000 
on the purchase of four cars, lost $5,000 to theft by her boyfriend, and consumed $14,980 in monthly expenses 
over 14 months.  She could not account for $19,534.  She also paid $88,000 for a house subject to a mortgage, but 
she had no source of regular income to pay the mortgage.  She sought to use the house as a source of income by 
means of some kind of sale that she could not describe to the court, but the buyer failed to make payments. As a 
result, she was left with a mortgage on a house she could not occupy.  The court denied a petition to sell future 
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The combination of the favorable tax treatment and the relatively low purchase price for a 
secure income stream appears to have made investing in structured settlement benefits irresistible to 
some investors, no matter what practices are used to achieve the deal.  In Maryland, the practice of 
factoring companies appears to be to approach “lead kids” shortly after they reach the age of majority, 
which explains why all but six of the sales in the Attorney General’s study involved sellers under the age 
of 30.74   The only source of protection is the state court’s review of proposed sales.  
Given the apparent congressional goal of encouraging people to accept a structured settlement 
to prevent dissipation of a lump sum and to decrease the need for means-tested public benefits, one 
would think that state court review statutes would focus on the economic security question.  That is, 
approval of a sale of a structured settlement should turn on whether the lump sum paid to the seller will 
be used to create a similar level of economic security.  For example, if a seller wants to use the lump 
sum to buy a house or open a business, approval should depend on whether the plan enhances the 
seller’s economic well-being.  If buying a house is likely to expose the seller to additional liabilities or 
responsibilities that are beyond the seller’s means, or if the business is likely to fail, then the plan should 
not be found to be in the seller’s best interests.   
Rather than focusing on economic security, however, the standard in most state statutes is 
vague.75  Like many, the Maryland Structured Settlement Protection Act adopts the federal standard:  
the court is authorized to approve the sale of benefits under a structured settlement upon a finding that 
                                                          
structured settlement payments on the basis, in part, that the recipient “shows a lack of the level of financial 
sophistication necessary to make good decisions about her finances.”). 
74 See State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement 
Spreadsheet (2016). 
75 Michigan’s statute provides an exception applicable in limited circumstances.  In cases where the structured 
settlement obligor, i.e., the annuity company, objects to the sale on the basis of a restriction on assignment, the 
sale can be approved only if the seller “will suffer imminent financial hardship” and the sale “will not render the 
payee unable to pay current or future normal living expenses.”  Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. §691.1304(e) (LexisNexis 
2006). 
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the sale is “in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s 
dependents.”76  Maryland’s relatively new language has not been the subject of interpretation as yet, 
and the term “best interests” is notoriously elastic.  Maryland courts may interpret it consistently with 
the more expansive statutory language adopted in California, which requires the court to consider 
whether the transfer is “fair, reasonable, and in the payee’s best interest” in light of the “totality of the 
circumstances,” including the seller’s “age, mental capacity, legal knowledge and apparent maturity 
level.”77  New York courts have interpreted the “best interests” language as including consideration of 
characteristics of the seller that might make it more or less likely that the seller would put the purchase 
price to good use, such as the seller’s mental capacity and the seller’s ability to earn a living and support 
dependents.78  Courts applying these standards can focus on many things, including economic security, 
but economic security is not necessarily determinative.  
                                                          
76 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-1102(b)(1) (West 2016) (“[I]n the best interest of the payee, taking into 
account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents”); cf. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 153/15 (West 2015) 
(best interest of the payee); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.99296(a)(3), (6) (West 2016)(“net amount payable to the payee is 
fair, just, and reasonable under the circumstances then existing;” “transfer is in the best interests of the payee, 
taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents”). 
77 CAL. INS. CODE § 10139.5 (West 2010) (totality of the circumstances includes seller’s “financial and economic 
situation,” the need of the seller for the future payments to “pay for future care and treatment” related to the 
underlying injury and the need of the seller for the payments “to pay for future necessary living expenses” along 
with multiple additional factors);  CAL. INS. CODE § 19137(a) (West 2010); see Corrie Erickson, Insurance: Chapter 
593:  A Structure for the Transfer of Structured Settlements, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 667 (2010) (statute requires that 
best interests of the petitioner be determined based on the “totality of the circumstances”). 
78 N.Y. Gen. Oblig. §5-1706(b) (West 2004); see Petition of 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v. Martinez, 11 Misc. 3d 
892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (although court found it likely that petitioner would squander the lump sum, petition was 
granted); Settlement Funding of N.Y. LLC v. Kiezel, 12 Misc. 3d 1155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (seven factors to be 
considered in determining best interests include the “beneficiary’s capacity to earn a living and support his or her 
dependents” and “the beneficiary’s intended usage of the proceeds”).  One New York court listed eight factors to 
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Even if the best interests standard plainly and narrowly focused on economic security, its 
usefulness as a filtering device turns on a court having adequate information to apply the standard to 
the situation of the petitioner.  In Maryland, as in other states, the court’s information about the “best 
interests” of the payee and the payee’s dependents is provided through the contents of the petition and 
a hearing.  The petition is nominally filed by the payee, but typically the buyer prepares and files it.  The 
petition must include, among other things, information about the terms of the sale, a listing of the 
payee’s dependents, a copy of disclosures about the transaction made to the payee, and a copy of the 
structured settlement agreement if available.79   It must be served on the payee and other “interested 
parties,” which typically means the insurance company with the annuity.80 
Even under a vague best interests standard, a court cannot determine whether the standard is 
met without some level of investigation.  Generally, states do not make a full investigation a prerequisite 
for the approval of a sale, which suggests that most states have decided that the cost of a full 
investigation outweighs the benefit.  For example, state laws do not require notice to or participation in 
the hearing by the seller’s dependents81 or by other parties who could shed light on the situation of the 
seller or the seller’s dependents, such as parents or other caregivers.  Further, none of the states 
provides for notice to or participation in the hearing by any government agency which may provide or 
be subject to providing support for the seller if the seller should dissipate the lump sum.  While 
                                                          
consider in determining best interests; none of them related to the use of the payment for the purpose of ensuring 
the seller’s economic security.  In re Settlement Capital Corp., 1 Misc. 3d 446, 455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
79 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-1102(b)(1) (West 2016); cf. CAL. INS. CODE § 10139(f)(2) (A-H) (West 2010) 
(same). 
80 See note **, supra.  
81 It is not impossible, of course, for a court to conclude that the sale is not in the best interests of the seller 
without hearing from the seller’s dependents.  See In re Settlement Capital Corp., 1 Misc. 3d 446, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2003).  Unless the dependent and/or the dependent’s guardian is notified about the petition and permitted to 
testify at the hearing, however, the court’s only source of information about the existence and needs of the 
dependent and the history of the seller’s level of responsibility toward the dependent is the seller.  In the absence 
of first-hand information, a court can be misled by simple mistakes, as well as efforts to mislead the court.   
Page 30  
California and New York point to the seller’s mental health as a circumstance to be considered on the 
question of best interests, neither state has a procedure other than the hearing for the court to gather 
information on the subject.  One court in New Jersey took the novel step of adopting a questionnaire to 
gather information and analyze the likelihood of a potential seller adequately investing a lump sum 
payment, which may be a quick way of assembling information but provides no assurance of accuracy.82  
  An unusual feature of the Maryland procedure is its attention to alerting the court that a case 
may involve lead poisoning or other sources of cognitive issues and a means for the court to become 
informed about the pertinence of those issues to the decision to sell the income stream.  First, the 
petition must include an affidavit from an independent financial advisor that includes information on 
whether the structured settlement arose from a claim by the seller of lead poisoning in which a mental 
or cognitive impairment was alleged and why the advisor concluded that the seller’s mental capacity 
was sufficient to understand the transaction.83  Second, where cognitive injuries may be present, the 
court must consider whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the payee or to have the payee 
examined by an independent mental health specialist.84  If the court decides to exercise its discretion to 
engage in the fuller inquiry, the investigation could be extensive and, as a corollary, expensive and time-
consuming.  
Maryland law uses the term “guardian ad litem” (GAL) in two ways.  The first is apparently what 
is intended in the context of the sale of a structured settlement:  a person who conducts an 
investigation for the purpose of advising the court.  The second, more common meaning is a person 
appointed as an advocate for someone who lacks capacity to act in a judicial proceeding, such as a 
minor, an adult under guardianship, or a person whose judgment is suspect.85  If the court should 
conclude, based on the report of the mental health specialist or the GAL, that the payee lacks capacity, 
the second type of GAL should come into play.   
                                                          
82 In re Keena, 442 N.J. Super. 393 (Law. Div. 2015).  The court said it approved transactions which “yield long-term 
benefits or address an urgent need.”  Only one of the ten listed examples, however, was for an expenditure that 
would allow the seller to get employed and improve the seller’s economic security.   
83 Md. R. Rules CIV. P. §15-1304.  
84 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §5-1104 (West 2016). 
85 See Fox v. Wills, 390 Md. 620 (2006); In re Lee, 132 Md. App. 696 (2000). 
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The statute provides that, rather than appointing a GAL, the court may appoint a mental health 
specialist.  It appears, therefore, that the investigation to be conducted by a GAL should focus on 
subjects other than the payee’s mental health.  Instead, the GAL’s investigation should provide the court 
with a broad perspective on the payee’s situation and whether the sale would result in the loss of a 
regular source of support or an enhanced life.  A complete GAL investigation may include interviews 
with people such as the seller’s dependents, the caregivers of any minor dependents, the seller’s 
parents and siblings, and the seller’s potential business partners, all of whom are likely to have 
significant information about the seller’s capacities to decide about and carry through on plans involving 
substantial amounts of money.  For example, if a seller like Mr. Martinez says that the lump sum is 
needed to open a barber shop,86 a guardian ad litem could investigate whether the business is one that 
is likely to yield a good living for the seller in light of the seller’s work experience, licensure, financial 
judgment, temperament and education.87  A home purchase may be an advisable investment, as Mr. 
Wilson thought, but only if the purchaser has the expertise and resources to maintain the home, pay the 
mortgage and property taxes, and so on.88   
In 2013, a seller who had been poisoned by lead as a child told the court that he wanted to buy 
a car.89  A GAL might have discovered, however, that the seller lacked a driver’s license and that having a 
car would not improve the seller’s access to a job or any other source of regular income.  In the absence 
of a GAL, the court approved the seller’s petition for the sale of $90,074 in payments in exchange for a 
lump sum in the amount of $26,194, some of which was used to buy a car.  After the seller was ticketed 
on four occasions for driving without a license, he permanently parked the car.90 A GAL’s investigation 
                                                          
86 See note **, supra. 
87 See note **, supra.   
88 In re Wilson, No. 310601-V310601V, 2009 WL 1569730 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 22, 2009). 
89 In re Petition of Vincent Maurice Jones, Jr., CAE 3-27280 (9/18/2013); Terrence McCoy, Cashing in off Poor Lead-
Poisoning Victims, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2015 (Jones was poisoned by lead as a young child; psychologist 
examination during lawsuit against landlord estimated Jones’ lifetime economic loss “at more than $1.5 million”). 
90 See Terrence McCoy, Cashing in off Poor Lead-Poisoning Victims, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2015. 
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could identify solutions other than a sale where the petitioner faces other problems, such as paying for a 
medical emergency or to pay off debts.91  
If the court decides to appoint an “Independent Mental Health Specialist,” it appears that the 
person’s role should be to examine the seller’s capacity to bring ordinary reasoning to long-term 
financial decisions and plans.  Such information would be important if the focus of a court’s inquiry is 
whether a seller has the capacity to enter into a contract, but, as discussed earlier, Congress rejected 
freedom of contract as the right way to think about these transactions.  If the pertinent question is, as it 
should be, whether the seller’s plans for the lump sum will result in financial security similar to the 
existing income stream, the capacity inquiry is important only if the seller plans to use the money for a 
business or an investment.  If the plan is to pay off debts, which is a common refrain in petitions, the 
seller’s capacity is not the key.  Instead, the key is whether the income stream produces greater financial 
security by being converted into a lump sum to satisfy a debt, a question better addressed by a GAL.   
                                                          
91 See Petition of 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v. Martinez, 816 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (describing In re 
Hall, Index No. 120232/03, the court said,  
the payee was an African American male in his early twenties who had received a structured 
settlement as an infant plaintiff in a lead poisoning case. The lead poisoning had left Mr. Hall with 
limited abilities. The well-intentioned Mr. Hall sought to sell his future structure payments for a 
fraction of their value to help his mother, who had fallen behind on her rent and been sued for 
nonpayment. Upon inquiring into whether the transfer was in Mr. Hall's best interest, this Court 
concluded that it was not. Mr. Hall's mother had fallen behind in her rent because she had 
become unable to manage her affairs. Protective Services for Adults assisted Mrs. Hall in the 
nonpayment proceeding, a guardian was appointed, and the rent arrears were paid through 
public assistance. In sum, the problem which was the stated justification for the proposed sale of 
payments was resolved without jeopardizing any of Mr. Hall's structured settlement rights. 
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Assuming that a capacity inquiry is pertinent, a thorough examination should include 
psychological testing.92  Some psychological testing is likely to have been done during the underlying 
lawsuit to determine whether and to what degree the seller’s capacity to earn a living has was affected 
by the childhood lead poisoning.93  The specialist is likely to conduct additional testing of the seller, 
especially in situations where testing using different methods was done for the underlying tort suit or 
where the underlying tort suit was settled many years earlier.  Like the GAL investigation, a thorough 
examination will be expensive and time-consuming. 
While the Maryland statute seems to insure that the court’s approval will be based on a full 
investigation, the statute falls short of making this a reality.  A court is not required to appoint a GAL or a 
mental health specialist; instead, the court is given discretion to do so.  It seems unlikely that either a 
GAL or a mental health specialist will be appointed in cases where judges think the cost is not 
worthwhile or where a judge is convinced that autonomy and freedom of contract are the keys to 
determining whether a petition should be granted, regardless of the Congressional intent or the 
statute’s investigation opportunities.   
Even if the court declines to appoint a GAL or mental health specialist, it still must hold a hearing 
before deciding whether to grant the petition.94  A hearing can provide significant information for a 
court that is tasked with determining whether the petition should be granted, as seems clear from the 
fact that courts rely heavily on facts deduced during hearings when they decide not to grant petitions.   
Prior to changes in the pertinent rules at the end of 2015, however, Maryland petitioners rarely 
attended the hearing.  In part, this happened because the statute allowed forum shopping.  Even though 
the bulk of the petitioners lived in Baltimore City,95 petitions were routinely filed in Prince George’s 
                                                          
92 See Theodore I. Lidsky, Agnes T. Heaney, Jay S. Schneider and John F. Rosen, Neurodevelopmental Effects of 
Childhood Exposure to Heavy Metals: Lessons from Pediatric Lead Poisoning, in NEUROGENETIC DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISORDERS:  VARIATION OF MANIFESTATION IN CHILDHOOD (Michele M.M. Mazzocco and Judith L. Ross eds., 2007). 
93 See note **, supra. 
94 MD. R. CIV. P. RULE §15-1305(a).  
95 See State of Maryland Office of The Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs. Access Funding, LLC, Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement 
Spreadsheet (2016).  
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County and other counties far from the city.  Further, no rule required the petitioner to attend the 
hearing.  Under the new rules and amended statute, petitions must be filed where the petitioner lives, 
and the petitioner generally must attend the hearing.96   
In sum, statutes such as Maryland’s Structured Settlement Protection Act do not provide a 
sufficient basis for justifying the sale of a structured settlement income stream where the income 
substitutes for the income the seller cannot generate because of childhood lead poisoning.   First, the 
focus of the best interests test should be on protecting the economic security of the seller and the 
seller’s dependents, not on other factors such as whether the seller has the capacity to enter into a 
contract.  Second, because the judicial review is not focused exclusively on the economic security of the 
seller, taxpayers provide a subsidy to the buyer that sacrifices revenue without achieving any public 
purpose.  Even worse, when a sale does not produce an alternative source of economic security for the 
seller, taxpayers may also pay a subsidy to the seller in the form of public benefits.97    
Third, unless the procedure includes an opportunity for the parent to be heard, a decision to 
allow a sale of structured settlement benefits denies the decisional autonomy of a parent who accepted 
a structured settlement on behalf of a minor child to ensure some economic security once the child 
became an adult.  The parent should also be heard because of the potential legal and moral 
responsibility the parent bears for supporting the adult disabled child,98 a duty the parent attempted to 
satisfy by accepting a structured settlement to settle the tort suit rather than a lump sum.   
                                                          
96 Forum shopping by factoring companies is discouraged by the law of other states as well.  See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 153/25 (West 2015); Terrence McCoy, Cashing in off Poor Lead-Poisoning Victims, WASH. POST, AUG. 26, 2015.  
97 See Ellen S. Pryor, Liability for Inchoate and Future Loss after Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1789 (2002) 
(justifiable to shift some of the cost of the judgment to taxpayers via favored tax treatment of structured 
settlement because alternative may be misuse of funds by a plaintiff who then becomes “dependent on the tax 
and welfare system”). 
98 In Maryland, the duty of support to an adult child is limited to those adult children who lack a means of 
subsistence so long as the reason the child cannot be self-supporting as a result of a mental or physical infirmity.  A 
parent cannot be charged with the duty of support unless the parent has or is able to earn sufficient means.  
Failure to provide support is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine or imprisonment.  Support can also be pursued in 
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Community interests in these cases generally align with the interests of taxpayers and parents.  
Since “lead kids” tend to live in areas of concentrated poverty, their communities may suffer an increase 
in poverty when multiple residents lose access to a reliable stream of income.99  When the income 
stream is gone and the lump sum is spent, further, the seller’s dependent child also loses access to 
parental support, and impoverishment is allowed to affect the next generation.  The possibility that 
some sellers might use a lump sum to invest in a business or a home in the community is too speculative 
to offset the loss unless the judicial process carefully considers which petitions are most likely to create 
substitute income streams.    
Factoring companies and investors have cause to complain if investments in structured 
settlements are closed off for invalid reasons.  Given that one feature of the investment is the favorable 
tax treatment, investors cannot complain about being denied the opportunity for the investment in 
cases when the congressional goals for the favorable tax treatment cannot be met.  Knowing whether a 
petitioner’s decision to sell will result in financial security, as discussed earlier, is a difficult question to 
answer and requires a full record.  Investors might be given a choice, therefore:  subsidize the costs of 
providing a court with sufficient information for it to make the requisite decision, including paying the 
GAL and any other consultants, or give up the investment.  If the investment is still worthwhile given the 
                                                          
a civil action.  See Md. Code ANN., Fam. Law § 13-109; Trembow v. Schonfeld, 393 Md. 327 (2006) (barring action 
by mother to establish duty after child reaches majority); Corby v. McCarthy, 154 Md. App. 446 (2003) (not 
unreasonable for adult child to live separately from mother, even though that increased mother’s expenses); 
Presley v. Presley, 65 Md. App. 265 (1985) (adult child employed, but earnings were insufficient to permit the adult 
child to live separately from her mother or to have a car; father ordered to pay a share of the adult child’s 
expenses).    
99 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Lead in the Water: A Tale of Social and Environmental Injustice, THE JAMA FORUM (May 
17, 2016), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2521956 (discussing high degree of exposure to 
environmental toxins like lead in poor communities and communities of color); Benfer, supra, at 64-69 (describing 
interests of communities in eliminating exposure to lead and in fair treatment of people exposed to lead); Ashley 
M. Drexel, Supported Decision-Making and the Sale of Structured Settlements (paper submitted to Families with 
Special Needs Seminar, University of Maryland Carey School of Law, 4/18/2016, on file with author). 
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costs of the litigation and the likelihood that fully-informed courts will deny many more petitions, then 
sales could continue.  The chance is miniscule, however, that investments would be lucrative in that 
environment, given that factoring companies complain about the costs of litigating petitions under the 
current permissive procedure in which nearly all petitions are approved.  
 
Alternative 3:  Prohibit the sale of structured settlement payments without the consent of a 
guardian of the property 
A guardianship of the property is a longstanding and well-tested method for preventing a person 
with capacity issues from having control of his or her property.100  When a court finds that a person lacks 
capacity to manage the property, the court takes control of the property and appoints a guardian to act 
for the court on behalf of the owner of the property, the person under guardianship or ward.101  The 
guardian’s duty has been described as similar to that of a trustee and includes the usual fiduciary 
duties.102  In the case of a person under guardianship who owns rights under a structured settlement, a 
guardianship of the property would transfer to the guardian the exclusive power to decide about all of 
the person’s property, including whether to sell any part of the structured settlement benefits and how 
the periodic payments will be spent.  The nominal recipient of benefits under the structured settlement, 
                                                          
100 See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §13-201(c) (West 2010) (“A guardian shall be appointed if the court determines 
that (1) the person is unable to manage his property and affairs effectively because of physical or mental disability, 
disease, habitual drunkenness, addiction to drugs, imprisonment, compulsory hospitalization, confinement, 
detention by a foreign power, or disappearance, and (2) the person has or may be entitled to property or benefits 
which require proper management).  
101 See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §13-201 (West 2010).  The Uniform Act does not require a finding of incapacity.  
See Robert B. Flemming and Rebecca C. Morgan, Standards for Financial Decision-Making:  Legal, Ethical, and 
Practical Issues, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1275, 1280.  See also Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and 
Recommendations, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 1191, 1191 (definition of guardian and conservator). 
102 See Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1195 (duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest and self-dealing); Robert B. Flemming and Rebecca C. Morgan, Standards for Financial 
Decision-Making:  Legal, Ethical, and Practical Issues, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1275, 1277-78. 
Page 37  
now a person under guardianship, would have no right to control the disposition of the property or any 
expenditures. 
At the theoretical level, a guardianship seems like a good idea, at least when compared with the 
way that structured settlement transactions occur now.  No sale could be approved unless the factoring 
company convinced the guardian to approve the sale.  Unlike the usual seller, especially one with a 
history of lead poisoning, a person named as guardian of property should have experience and 
understanding in financial transactions to make well-considered decisions on behalf of the person under 
guardianship.  The guardian is also under a duty of loyalty, which should preclude the guardian from 
making a sale for reasons other than the well-being of the person under guardianship.  Finally, guardians 
are subject to judicial supervision and other protections such as bonding and liability for failure to act 
properly. 
At the practical level, however, the guardianship alternative is less impressive.   
First, many people with the deficits typical of lead poisoning may not meet the criteria for the 
appointment of a guardian.  In Maryland, for example, guardianship of the property is permissible when 
a person is “unable to manage his property and affairs effectively because of physical or mental 
disability….”103  A person who has been awarded a structured settlement due to lead poisoning is not 
likely to be capable of self-support, but that same person may have no problem handling a paycheck, 
paying rent, or buying food.  Property management issues are likely to become acute only when the 
person is facing longer-term and more complex decisions, such as those involving the sale of a 
structured settlement.  Since most people do not confront such issues on a routine basis, a court could 
find that a guardianship of the property is not justified.104 
                                                          
103 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & Trusts, §§13-201 – 13-221 (West 2010); MD. RULE 10-202; MD. RULE 10-301 et seq.; see In 
re Rosenberg, 211 Md. App. 305 (2013); James B. Nutter & Co. v. Black, 225 Md. App. 1 (2015); Meta S. David, 
Legal Guardianship of Individuals Incapacitated by Mental Illness:  Where Do We Draw the Line?, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 465 (2012); Ellen A. Callegary, Guardianship and Its Alternatives in the 21st Century, 47 No. 3 MD. B.J. 18 
(2014).  Several lawyers in Baltimore have advised the author that they do not suggest that parents of lead-
poisoned children seek guardianship when the child turns 18 because courts are unlikely to grant the petition. 
104 Petitions may not be filed for some people who might qualify for the appointment of a guardian of the property 
because of the expense and other practical difficulties.  In Maryland, for example, the court must be provided with 
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Second, guardianship of the property may impinge further on the autonomy of the seller than 
necessary.  In Maryland, as in most states, guardianship of the property is an all or nothing proposition:  
where a guardianship is deemed necessary, the court enters a plenary order placing all of the property 
under the management of the guardian.105  The court is not required to consider a less restrictive 
alternative.106  A lead-poisoned recipient of benefits under a structured settlement is likely to have two 
categories of property:  the promised income stream and the payments after they are in the hands of 
the recipient.  Guardianship is only important with respect to the promised income stream because that 
is the asset for which there is a market and because the decision about whether to sell or retain that 
income stream is both complex and important for the future economic security of the potential seller.  
Without the income stream, the recipient ordinarily has no source of regular support and risks becoming 
dependent on government benefits and/or family support.    
                                                          
two certificates of competency completed by health care providers, and one of those must have examined the 
person within 21 days before the petition is filed.  See James B. Nutter & Co. v. Black, 225 Md. App. 1 (2015); Ellen 
A. Callegary, Guardianship and Its Alternatives in the 21st Century, 47 No. 3 MD. B.J. 18, 21 (2014).  Where the 
structured settlement is based on childhood lead poisoning, neurological examination is done on the plaintiff, but 
that examination may occur long before the plaintiff turns 18 or considers selling benefits payable under the 
structured settlement.  The second examination probably cannot be performed without input from the potential 
seller.  The seller has little reason to cooperate, so a petition for guardianship and motion for examination must be 
filed before the examination occurs.  Concerned parents might be persuaded not to initiate the petition because of 
the family conflict, the expense, and the possibility that the petition would be unsuccessful in any event. 
105 See A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship:  A Little Hope for the Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 
1541, 1545; Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):  Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the 
Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 164-67, 171-75 (2010) 
(guardianship generally is plenary even when court is authorized to enter a more limited order and involves 
“supplanting, rather than assisting the decision-making process” of the person under guardianship). 
106 See In re Rosenberg, 211 Md. App. 305 (2013). 
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A guardianship should not be essential with respect to the periodic payments and other income 
acquired by the recipient because the recipient’s decisions about expenditures, whether provident or 
improvident, have little impact on the person’s long-term financial security or dependency on family 
support or public benefits.  Even where a recipient spends all of his or her income frivolously, the next 
periodic payment can be spent differently.  Further, a person who is entitled to an income stream under 
a structured settlement is not likely to establish eligibility for public benefits based on the loss of one 
payment to improvident expenditures.   Once a person’s property is under guardianship, however, all 
decisions are under the control of the guardian, whether the decision affects the long-term economic 
security of the ward or the short-term impact of improvidence in the use of a particular periodic 
payment.  The guardian is empowered to decide whether and how much money will be spent on rent, 
on food, on support of or gifts to family and friends, on clothing, and so on.   
Depriving the recipient of autonomy with respect to spending a periodic payment is 
unwarranted outside of the rare situation where the recipient’s cognitive capacities are so severely 
impaired that no financial decision is within his or her ken.  Even a severely-impaired person can make 
sensible decisions, such as paying rent and child support or buying a gift for a friend or a loved one.107  
Further, having control over the periodic payments gives the recipient opportunities to learn how to 
manage financial responsibilities.  Bad decisions are not avoided, but they can be the source of relatively 
little harm.108  When a recipient fails to pay rent and gets evicted, for example, the recipient will be 
homeless for a period of time, but the next periodic payment should help the recipient pay for the next 
                                                          
107 See Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):  Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the 
Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 168-170 (2010) 
(deprivation of right to make financial decision impacts the social relationships of the person under guardianship, 
as well as that person’s “functional abilities and general well-being—an impact which itself has further isolating 
effects” at social, physical and emotional levels). 
108 See Robert B. Flemming and Rebecca C. Morgan, Standards for Financial Decision-Making:  Legal, Ethical, and 
Practical Issues, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1275, 1294 (inappropriate for a guardian to deny decision-making authority to a 
person under guardianship as to some of the estate where a relatively small risk of mismanagement is offset by 
the benefits of autonomy and self-management and the reduction of fees payable to the guardian). 
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home.  A recipient who fails to pay child support can be placed under an order requiring the annuity 
company to remit the child support directly to the child’s household. 
If the guardian of the property in the case of a structured settlement is limited to the decision 
about whether the asset should be sold, however, the job of the guardian would be quite different from 
the job of a most guardians.  Usually, a ward needs to have someone make decisions about all of the 
property, and the guardian has multiple opportunities to learn who the ward is and what the ward 
needs.  Further, the ward may have family and friends – and even heirs or devisees – who may keep an 
eye on the guardian.  Where the guardian’s main job is to decide whether a structured settlement 
should be sold and where the ward is a person from a poor neighborhood and a poor family, there may 
be no adequate input or watchdog.  Cases of guardians failing to comply with their duties toward wards 
in such circumstances are not infrequent.109 
Third, the guardian may be a family member rather than a person with professional training or 
expertise in complex financial transactions.110  A family member may be appointed to avoid the expense 
of a professional serving as guardian.  Training may be made available to a family guardian, but judicial 
supervision may be less rigorous.111  A family member, however, may have a greater likelihood of 
confronting a serious conflict of interest, because the family member may get to control the use of all or 
part of the lump sum received in exchange for the stream of payments.   
Fourth, judicial supervision of the guardian is mandated in the Maryland statute and in other 
statutes, which means that the guardian is required to file periodic reports, justify decisions and 
                                                          
109 See Sally Hurme and Erica Wood, Introduction, Symposium Third National Guardianship Summit:  Standards of 
Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 1160-62 (recounting evidence of malfeasance by guardians).   
110 See Robert B. Flemming and Rebecca C. Morgan, Standards for Financial Decision-Making:  Legal, Ethical, and 
Practical Issues, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1275, 1284. 
111 See Robert B. Flemming and Rebecca C. Morgan, Standards for Financial Decision-Making:  Legal, Ethical, and 
Practical Issues, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1275, 1325-26 (recommending that states reject practice of applying lower 
standards to family guardians). 
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expenses about matters such as fees, etc.112  Where the guardian’s role is exclusively about whether a 
particular asset should be sold, however, the periodic reporting would be ineffective and costly.113  A 
different system would be necessary, therefore, to monitor the work of a guardian whose sole 
responsibility is to decide whether a particular asset should be sold.  Finally, the guardian’s fee is, in 
many cases, dependent on the value of the assets the guardian is managing.  If the only asset is the 
structured settlement and it is in the best interests of the ward for it to be sold, the guardian may be 
placed in a conflict of interest with the ward.       
Guardianship has been the subject of criticism by scholars.  The principal goal of reformers is to 
enhance the respect accorded the person under guardianship and to require that the person have more 
control over decisions or, at least, more input.114  A reformed guardianship that is more “person-
                                                          
112 See Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1193 (duty 
of guardian to keep court informed); Robert B. Flemming and Rebecca C. Morgan, Standards for Financial Decision-
Making:  Legal, Ethical, and Practical Issues, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1275, 1324; Sally Hurme and Erica Wood, 
Introduction, Symposium Third National Guardianship Summit:  Standards of Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 
1175-78 (judicial supervision of fees, along with other guardianship matters, inconsistent and often 
unsatisfactory). 
113 See Sally Hurme and Erica Wood, Introduction, Symposium Third National Guardianship Summit:  Standards of 
Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 1175-76. 
114 See Nina A. Kohn, et al., Supported Decision-Making:  A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
1111 (2013); Mary Jane Ciccarello and Maureen Henry, Person-Centered Planning and Supported Decision-Making, 
27 UTAH B.J. 48 (2014); A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship:  A Little Hope for the Future, 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1541 (2012); Soumitra Pathare and Laura S. Shields, Supported Decision-Making for Persons with 
Mental Illness:  A Review, 34 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1 (2012); Leslie Salzman, Substituted Decision-Making as a Violation 
of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 (2010); Robert B. 
Fleming and Rebecca C. Morgan, Standards for Financial Decision-Making:  Legal, Ethical, and Practical Issues, 2012 
UTAH L. REV. 1275; Erica Wood, Guardianship and Supported Decision-Making, 37 No. 2 BIFOCAL 44 (2015); Catherine 
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centered”115 might be a better fit for a guardianship of the property in structured settlement cases 
because the focus is on who the person under guardianship is and what that person wants to 
accomplish.  A person-centered guardianship shifts the focus away from what a guardian believes to be 
a prudent path.  If a person wants to sell some of the stream of payments in order to buy a car, for 
example, a person-centered guardianship process might begin with a meeting in which the person and 
the guardian discuss why a car is important to the person and some of the specifics about driving a car, 
types of cars and so on.  The next step might be a meeting with others who may have an interest in 
whether benefits are sold in order to obtain the car, such as family members, dependents, caregivers, 
counselors, and friends.  Reasons that the person wants a car can be disclosed and discussed, and 
transportation and financing options can be developed.  The final decision, depending on the type of 
person-centered system that is in play, rests with the person under guardianship or the guardian.  In 
                                                          
A. Seal and Michael A. Kirtland, Using Mediation in Guardianship Litigation, 24 No. 3 EXPERIENCE 16 (2015); Sally 
Hurme and Erica Wood, Introduction, Symposium Third National Guardianship Summit:  Standards of Excellence, 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157; Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and Recommendations, 2012 Utah L. REV. 
1191, 1192, 1194 (guardian’s plans “shall emphasize a ‘person-centered philosophy’”; conservator’s property 
management shall “maximize the dignity, autonomy, and self-determination of the person”); Stanley S. Herr, Self 
Determination, Autonomy, and Alternatives for Guardianship, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES 429 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003). 
115 See A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship:  A Little Hope for the Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 
1541, 1547-48 (2012) (no unitary or precise definition of person-centered guardianship exists; “key elements … 
include person-directed preferences and establishing a vision based on network building, which requires 
collaborative teamwork with the use of a facilitator…individual[] the center of planning and decision making, while 
… family members [are treated] as partners.”); Sally Hurme and Erica Wood, Introduction, Symposium Third 
National Guardianship Summit:  Standards of Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 1172 (“Person-centered planning 
is a process that is directed by the individual as much as possible, with assistance or support as chosen by the 
individual.”). 
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either event, the process fully involves the person under guardianship and consideration of his or her 
goals and capacities.116    
Changing guardianship into a person-centered system is not feasible at this time, even if it is 
desirable in many cases.  First, guardianship law in every state would require significant statutory 
reform.117  Second, funding sources would have to be found because person-centered guardianship 
requires a higher degree of consultation with the person under guardianship, as well as with family, 
friends and professionals who might have information about what is the best decision in the 
circumstances and whether the person under guardianships wants to follow that advice.118  In the case 
of the sale of a structured settlement, a full consultation process could include people with expertise 
into financial planning, business development, cognitive and behavioral capacity, family responsibility, 
and government benefits.  As with the judicial process to consider petitions to approve the sale of 
structured benefits, the question is whether the additional cost is worthwhile119 when the benefits to 
the recipient of the structured settlement might be small.  Third, person-centered guardianship appears 
                                                          
116 See A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship:  A Little Hope for the Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 
1541, 1549-55 (case study examples of person-centered planning). 
117 See A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship:  A Little Hope for the Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 
1541, 1544 (“no statutes, regulations, or standards mandate person-centered guardianship”). 
118 See Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making:  A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
1111 (2013); Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):  Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the 
Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 227-31 (2010) 
(supported decision-making likely to be more expensive, and underfunding is already the norm in state-run 
guardianship systems). 
119 Concern about the expenses associated with guardianship are particularly acute when a person under 
guardianship has few assets to begin with.  See Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and 
Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1202 (need to provide public funding for guardianship services). 
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to focus more on personal decision-making than on financial decision-making, so it is less clear that the 
concept would be meaningful in the context of the sale of a structured settlement.120  
   
Section 4:  The Sale of Structured Settlements Should be Banned Where Lead-Poisoning Has Deprived 
the Recipient of the Capacity for Self Support 
As suggested at the beginning of the article, whether sales of structured settlement benefits 
should be allowed turns on four criteria: 
1. The autonomy of the potential seller must be respected to the extent appropriate given the 
nature of the irreversible damage caused by lead poisoning in cases where the person is left 
without the capacity for self-support. 
2. The nature of the factoring market must be taken into account in determining whether lead-
poisoned sellers can be protected from exploitation at a reasonable cost. 
3. The cost of providing judicial oversight of sales or sellers must be measured against the likely 
effectiveness of the oversight in terms of protecting potential sellers and their dependents 
against an unjustifiable loss of financial security.  
4. The costs that sales may impose on third parties, including taxpayers, parents, dependents, and 
communities.   
Prohibiting sales has a direct and unmistakable impact on the autonomy of the seller.  While the 
received wisdom is that economic security is more important than the seller’s other goals, sellers may 
disagree.  Sellers have indicated a preference for a variety of other goals, including paying off debt, 
buying a car, impressing friends and potential romantic partners, giving gifts, buying a house, starting a 
business, and paying medical expenses.   
Justifying the “parentalism” of denying the opportunity to sell structured settlement benefits 
begins with an examination of what happens to children when they are exposed to lead.  As described 
earlier, the neurological impacts tend to be strongest in exactly the areas a person relies on when 
making important life decisions, such as trading economic security to accomplish short-term goals.  In 
the case of a seller whose childhood lead poisoning was substantial enough to justify a prediction of a 
                                                          
120 See note **, supra.  See generally Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):  Substituted Decision Making 
as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 
(2010) (principal example is one involving guardianship of the person, not of the property). 
Page 45  
permanent full or partial loss of the capacity for self-support, problems are undeniable in the realms of 
cognition, executive functioning and behavior.  Exercising reasonable levels of judgment as to long-term 
planning and execution cannot be expected. 
A second consideration is the degree of loss of autonomy.  Banning the sale of structured 
settlement benefits does not deny the seller the right to use the stipend, once received, in any way the 
seller wants.  If the seller wants to buy a house or a car or start a business, the seller can use the right to 
the monthly benefits to persuade a lender to take the risk of making funds available.  If the seller’s goals 
are to buy gifts or to use money to help or impress friends or relatives, the regular stipend can be used, 
even though the amounts are smaller than a lump sum.  Satisfying debt, a common goal of petitioners, 
can be accomplished over time.  The seller’s interest payments to creditors will be higher, but probably 
lower than the discount rates charged by buyers of structured settlement benefits. 
A third consideration is that the structured settlement itself is the product of a tort system 
whose principal purposes include compensating the plaintiff for the injuries experienced because of the 
tort.121  In the case of childhood lead poisoning, the economic loss caused by the defendant’s tort is the 
inability of the plaintiff to earn a living.  While money alone cannot make the plaintiff whole, a regular 
stipend is more like a paycheck than a lump sum, unless the plaintiff can use the lump sum to generate a 
flow of income, something that is unlikely to occur in the circumstances.122   
At least at least 70 percent of the petitions for sales of structured settlement benefits filed 
between 2013 and 2015 in Maryland involved lead-poisoned sellers.  A ban on sales, therefore, would 
sharply reduce the number of investment opportunities available in this market.  Justifying the loss turns 
                                                          
121 See Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring?  The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859, 
875; Ellen S. Pryor, After the Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1776-78 (2002) (discussing usefulness of structured 
settlement for loss minimization). 
122 See Ellen S. Pryor, Liability for Inchoate and Future Loss after Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1778 (2002) 
(arguing that a structured settlement should be preferred to a lump sum when “the plaintiff’s ability to manage 
the lump sum in a way that promotes this match [between the plaintiff’s needs and the tort payments that the 
plaintiff recovers] and the accuracy with which any fixed schedule of payments matches the plaintiff’s future 
needs”). 
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on the nature of the factoring business that makes the investment possible.  As described earlier, 
factoring companies appear to have targeted “lead kids” in Baltimore to persuade them to sell 
structured settlement benefits, which accounts for the fact that the Attorney General’s research 
disclosed that at least 70 percent of the petitions over a two-year period involved lead poisoned sellers, 
and that 112 of the 132 lead-poisoned petitioners were under the age of 30 and residents of Baltimore 
City or the nearby suburbs.123  All but two of the “independent” professional advisors involved in the 112 
petitions were the same person, a person who appears to have had a close relationship with at least one 
of the most active factoring companies.124 
                                                          
123 State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. v. Access Funding, LLC, Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement 
Spreadsheet (2016); see Kelly McGann, It’s My Money and I Want It Now, Your Honor, 48 No. 3 MD. B.J. 36, 41 
(2015) (evidence is strong that buyers prey on categories of sellers who are least able to protect themselves from 
bad deals and fraudulent practices); United States Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Access Funding et al., 
Case 1:16-cv-03759-JFM Document 1 Filed 11/21/16 (complaint alleging that 1) many of the consumers who sold 
settlements to Access were lead-paint poisoning victims with cognitive impairments, and that such consumers 
received “a steeply discounted lump sum in return for signing away their future payment streams,” 2) defendant 
Access steered petitioners to another defendant, a cooperative attorney who would satisfy the requirement of 
Maryland law for a consumer to submit a letter stating that he or she consulted with an independent financial 
advisor and get paid $200 for each letter; and 3) that, while petitions were pending, defendant Access provided 
advances to many petitioners and then told them that they would have to repay the advance if the sale were not 
completed). 
124 State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General Consumer Protection Div. vs Access Funding, LLC, Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City, Case Number 24C16002855, Complaint Exhibit A, Access Funding Structured Settlement 
Spreadsheet (2016). 
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Maryland’s experience is not unique, but it indicates the type of problems that regulators face 
when trying to keep the industry within consumer-friendly limits.125  The expense is worthwhile if the 
transactions offer enough residents a benefit that can be obtained at a reasonable cost.  What appears 
to be the case, however, is that the buyer gains far more than the seller in these transactions, since the 
seller is giving up financial security at a high cost, while the buyer is gaining a nearly guaranteed regular 
income stream accompanied by favorable tax treatment.  The temptation for the buyer to overstep the 
boundaries of good practices is strong, and the existence of a vulnerable group of sellers makes it 
unusually difficult to rely on the usual consumer protections to regulate the market.   
As explained earlier, the state court judicial review mandated under the tax law or, in the 
alternative, a guardianship of the property are expensive ways to impose an additional level of judgment 
to the decision to sell structured settlement benefits.  The cost would be worthwhile if either were to do 
a better job than a ban, in terms of balancing the seller’s autonomy against protecting the seller’s 
economic security.  The number of cases in which a sale protects or advances the seller’s economic 
security are few, however, given the realities of neurological damage to lead poisoned people.  The 
court’s job, as well as the guardian’s job, therefore, would be to identify those rare cases and distinguish 
them from all the others where the seller has other goals or where the seller has economic security 
goals that the seller cannot realistically achieve.   Perhaps that sifting could be done if there were 
resources for a full investigation by a GAL and a mental health professional in every case or if every 
seller had a close relationship with a guardian who had access to financial expertise.  Otherwise, both 
the court and the guardian come close to flying blind and the process of summarily approving petitions 
is likely to continue.   
The interests of third parties, including taxpayers, parents, dependents and members of the 
community are the final issue.  Their concerns appear to be relevant to recipients of structured 
settlements in workers compensation cases.  As discussed earlier, most states ban sales of this stream of 
income even though a workers compensation award can be based on physical harm where the person 
                                                          
125 See Daniel W. Hindert and Craig H. Ulman, Transfers of Structured Settlement Payment Rights:  What Judges 
Should Know about Structured Settlement Protection Acts, 44 No. 2 JUDGES’ J. 19, 20 (2005) (history of exploitation 
by factoring companies). 
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has suffered no cognitive or other neurological harm. 126   Since the rationale for restricting autonomy in 
these cases does not seem to turn on the likelihood that sellers have impaired judgment, the likely 
rationale is the secondary costs of a sale on third parties, such as taxpayers and families, who would 
bear the cost of a sale if the seller used the lump sum for something other than self-support and family 
support.127 
Lead poisoning is not an isolated event; it tends to affect people throughout entire 
communities, particularly poor communities and, in urban areas, poor communities of color.  When 
many residents have been harmed, as in Baltimore, they even acquire a name – “lead kids.”  If enough 
lead kids sell their income stream and then fail to use the payment to acquire a different source of 
economic security, the entire community may pay the price of having even more residents who 
experience long-term and inter-generational poverty.128  
Banning sales could be done directly or indirectly.  Indirect means, as suggested earlier, include 
removing the favorable tax treatment when the income stream is transferred.  Without the extra value, 
investors may lose interest.  Alternatively, factoring companies may make the deals sweeter by 
increasing the discount rates.  This may result in fewer sales, but some people may still be willing to sell.  
                                                          
126 See, e.g., Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 714 (D. Me 2009); Rapid 
Settlements, Ltd. V. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 714 (D. Me 2009); In re Dunn, 848 N.E.2d 310 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Cal. Lab. Code §4900; Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-23-108; Fla. Stat. Ann. §440.22; 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
ann. 305/21; Md. Code, Lab. & Emp. Art. §9-732; Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. §5-1106; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, 
§106; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231C, §5; Mich. Comp. Law. Ann. §418.821; Minn. Stat. Ann. §549.34; N.Y. Workers’ 
Comp. Law §33; Pa. Stat. Ann. §4003; Va. Code Ann. §59.1-477.1. 
127 See Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 294 (1911) (in sustaining constitutionality of worker’s compensation 
statute as proper exercise of state’s police power, court said “the loss falls immediately upon the employee who is 
almost invariably unable to bear it, and ultimately upon the community which is taxed for the support of the 
indigent”). 
128 See Benfer, supra; Ashley M. Drexel, Supported Decision-Making and the Sale of Structured Settlements (paper 
submitted to Families with Special Needs Seminar, University of Maryland Carey School of Law, 4/18/2016, on file 
with author).  
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Unfortunately, the most likely pool of potential sellers would probably continue to be people with the 
least capacity for self-protection, and that includes people with childhood lead poisoning.  Unless 
enforcers of consumer protection laws are highly vigilant, exploitation of sellers seems inevitable.  The 
record of enforcers has not been robust, and there is no reason to believe that will change. 
The second indirect means would be to define “best interests” in the pertinent federal and state 
statutes to mean economic security for the seller and the seller’s dependents, except in cases of 
extreme hardship or emergency.  The state court review and approval process would continue, but it 
would be significantly more comprehensive and expensive, and the standard for approval would be 
harder to meet.  Discerning which transactions might qualify would require, at a minimum, an 
investigation by a GAL, notice to and an opportunity to be heard by appropriate third parties, and advice 
from experts into the circumstances of the financial hardship or emergency issues.   
This alternative has the advantage of respecting the decisions made by the parents and the 
taxpayers about the importance of economic security of the seller.  The communities in which “lead 
kids” are well-known also benefit because more residents will have access to economic stability.  The 
biggest downside is the high cost.  If the costs of this investigation is borne by the buyer, the value of the 
investment would decrease unless the buyer could pass the costs on to the seller by means of a higher 
discount rate.  If courts are reviewing deals in detail, few should be found to meet the more stringent 
standard.  Alternatively, investors could try to persuade states to pay the costs.  Given that taxpayers 
already subsidize purchases through the tax break, it seems unlikely that many states will see the need 
to say yes. 
A third indirect method is to require that every seller be evaluated to for the appointment of a 
guardian of the property should be appointed.  In cases where the seller becomes a person under 
guardianship, the sale could occur only with the guardian’s consent.  Unless the guardianship system is 
reformed, however, a guardianship is a deep and unnecessary invasion into the seller’s autonomy.  
Finding a competent and incorruptible guardian would be difficult, at best.  Even if the system is 
reformed to value more highly the autonomy of the seller, the process will be too expensive to make the 
investment worthwhile. 
The simplest, most direct and least expensive route to a solution, then, is to follow the example 
of worker’s compensation:  ban the sale of structured settlements.  If injured workers can be required to 
sacrifice autonomy in exchange for a reliable alternative source of economic security, people injured by 
lead as children probably have no room for complaint.  Investors who want to continue to have access 
to the investment opportunities represented by structured settlement income streams will be 
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disappointed, of course, but their sacrifice is justified by the benefits to injured sellers, the families of 
sellers and communities where sellers live.  Taxpayers may gain the most in several ways.  First, the 
favorable tax treatment accorded to structured settlements does not result in less tax revenue unless 
the favored taxpayer makes enough money to pay taxes.  Few sellers have that kind of income and 
resources, but many investors do.  Second, taxpayer-funded public benefits will not need to be paid to 
sellers who do not sell their income stream.  Third, public funding for judicial oversight and consumer 
protection enforcement can be put to other uses.  In short, banning sales of structured settlement 
benefits that result from a tort suit for childhood lead poisoning is pretty much a win-win. 
